主题：Rationalizable Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information
主讲人：王子伟 武汉大学
主持人：杨仁琨 暨南大学
时间：2023年12月14日（周四）上午10:00-11:30
地点：暨南大学石牌校区威尼斯欢乐娱人v675大楼（中惠楼）102室
摘要
This paper proposes a new notion of stability to study matching markets with one-sided incomplete information. The main contribution lies in formulating a proper definition of the endogenous beliefs of uninformed agents and establishing consistency conditions for these beliefs. We define a criterion of stability and iteratively apply it to remove outcomes that cannot be deemed stable. Our solution concept, the set of rationalizable stable outcomes, is the limit of this procedure. We prove the existence of rationalizable stable outcomes using a fixed-point characterization. Additionally, we offer two alternative characterizations of the solution concept. The first characterization provides an informationally robust interpretation, connecting the non-equilibrium approach we pursue with the equilibrium approach pioneered by Liu (2020). The second one reveals the epistemic assumptions implicit in the iterative definition.
主讲人简介
王子伟，武汉大学经济与管理学院助理教授，威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校经济学博士。主要研究领域为博弈论，匹配理论和信息经济学。研究成果发表于经济学国际期刊Social Choice and Welfare，并担任GEB，JEBO，JET，REDesign等期刊的匿名审稿人。
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校对|李仲达
责编|麦嘉杰
初审|黄振
终审发布|何凌云
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